


24 SEP 1963

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

17 September 1963



MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Political Risks Involved in Reducing US Forces
in Europe

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to express concern over reported plans for reducing US forces in Europe by something of the order of 30,000 men. We lack enough information about the plan to assess the political impact of such a reduction in any detail, and in any event do not argue that it would necessarily be impossible to justify such reductions to our Allies. Much would obviously depend on the nature and location of the units involved, the military justification for the reduction, the manner in which the matter was raised with our Allies, and so forth. However, we do wish to call attention to the potential political dangers involved in any substantial reduction of US forces in Europe at this time and to urge that these potential political dangers be fully taken into account in any consideration of the matter.

2. The basic danger lies in the persistent tendency, particularly among the West Germans, but not among them alone, to interpret any diminution of the American military presence

SECRET

on the Continent as indication of waning US interest and as a portent of an eventual US withdrawal from European defense. You doubtless recall the tremors of alarm that arose in West Germany in 1956 over the so-called Radford plan for drastic reduction of US forces in Europe and again in late 1960 over newspaper leaks that a major cut was being contemplated. It is hard to believe that the Germans or others could overreact quite as drastically now in the wake of the President's recent trip and other evidences of continuing US commitments.

3. Yet it is worth noting that this is precisely the point that de Gaulle and his supporters have harped on in their assertion that the Europeans should free themselves from their dependence on US military powers. Moreover, many Europeans will inevitably link any reduction of US European garrisons to the concept of East-West detente. At best they will be tempted to regard such a reduction as indication that the US considers the dangers of Soviet aggression to have been significantly reduced and that their own defense efforts can be relaxed. At worst they may see it as resulting from a secret deal with the USSR -- much as many regarded the US decision last spring to remove the outmoded Jupiter missiles from Italy and Turkey as part of a deal over Cuba. In either

SECRET

SECRET

case, the US is likely to encounter greater resistance than ever to its efforts to induce the other NATO members to increase their contributions to NATO.

4. We also consider there is some danger that US actions of this sort, if not properly coordinated and explained, may create the impression of uncertainty and unpredictability in US military policy. We believe that Allied confidence in the wisdom and steadiness of US policy has already been undercut to some degree by such developments as: the shift from last year's strong emphasis on the need for a conventional NATO buildup to this year's sudden concentration on the multilateral nuclear force concept as well; the improvisations and sudden policy changes precipitated by the decision to drop the Skybolt missile; and what appears to be -- notably in the case of the Skybolt and Jupiter decisions -- a tendency to move ahead with otherwise militarily and financially justified actions without fully considering possible political consequences.

5. It might be noted that the decision to reorganize and reduce the troop strength of the Berlin garrison at the height of the test ban treaty debate in Germany raised some cries of concern. At present the US is involved in a somewhat delicate negotiation with West Germany and France over plans to reduce

SECRET

SECRET

US logistic installations in France and at the same time
establish a combat logistics system with West Germany
involving some use of French facilities.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

1



25X1

SHERMAN KENT
Chairman

SECRET

19 SEP 1963

Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000100020032-6

UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET
--------------	--------------	--------

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Executive Director	20 Sept	
2	DDCI 9/23/63		
3	DCI		
4			
5			
6			

ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Forwarded —
CONCUR:

Deputy Director (Intelligence)

I do not entirely concur in this memo, since the reduction announced is probably not as drastic as to have far-reaching effects of the sort noted and since there are other considerations of some magnitude which argue in favor of a troop strength reduction. The basic analysis in this memo is sound, however, and I am forwarding it as of interest to the DCI.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE

AD/NE

9/18/63

Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000100020032-6

MEMORANDUM FOR: Sherman Kent

Noted by DCI who wants no dissemination.

W. Elder

Amen



25 Sept

24 Sept 63
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

DCI: *Do not release*

*I consider this a
public relations problem
more than anything else -
Take a little doing, but
not mountains out of
mole-hills -*

[Signature]

CONFIDENTIAL

19 SEP 1963


19 September 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for National Estimates
SUBJECT : ONE Memorandum for the Director, dtd
17 Sept 63, Subj: Political Risks Involved
in Reducing US Forces in Europe

For your information, DD/I made the following comment
on routing slip forwarding subject memorandum to the
Director.

"I do not entirely concur in this memo, since the
reduction announced is probably not so drastic as
to have far-reaching effects of the sort noted and
since there are other considerations of some
magnitude which argue in favor of a troop strength
reduction. The basic analysis in this memo is
sound, however, and I am forwarding it as of
interest to the DCI.

RSC"



O/DDI

25X1

CONFIDENTIAL